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HEARING OFFICER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA RY_________

BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF AN INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,) Nos. 03-0263, 04-0158, 04-1495)
ALAN B. SHAW, Bar No. 012882)))
RESPONDENT.) HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A Complaint was filed on July 26, 2004. Respondent filed an Answer on September 15, 2004. The parties filed a Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent and a Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent on October 29, 2004. A hearing was not held. The Commission reviewed the matter on February 12, 2005. The Commission rejected the consent documents and remanded the matter to this Hearing Officer on March 11, 2005. The parties filed a Second Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Tender) and a Joint Memorandum in Support of Second Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Joint Memo) on April 27, 2005. A hearing on the Tender and Joint Memo was held on May 2, 2005.

FINDINGS OF FACT

At all times relevant, Respondent was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona, having been admitted to practice in Arizona on October 21, 1989.

COUNT ONE (FILE NO. 03-0263)

In June 2000, Diane Heard retained Respondent to represent her in a bankruptcy matter. The petition was filed on August 21, 2000, with the discharge issued on December 22, 2000. The case was closed on February 8, Respondent failed to transmit a reaffirmation agreement from Chrysler Financial to Ms. Heard, resulting in failure to report all Ms. Heard's timely payments which adversely affected Ms. Heard's credit. Also, Respondent promised to contact one of Ms. Heard's former husband's credit card companies that was holding Ms. Heard responsible as a principal for the debt even though she was not a principal on the card, and had filed for bankruptcy. Respondent failed to contact the credit card company as promised.

In response to complaints by Ms. Heard who was forced to retain new counsel, Respondent promised to pay Ms. Heard \$353.00. Respondent never paid the \$353.00 to Ms. Heard.

On December 8, 2003, the Probable Cause Panelist issued an Order of Diversion for case file no. 03-0263. The Order of Diversion directed Respondent

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to contact the Director of the Lawyer Assistance Program within 20 days from the date the Order was mailed to Respondent. The order was mailed to Respondent on January 6, 2004. Respondent did not contact anyone at the State Bar regarding the Order of Diversion. The Director of the Lawyer Assistance Program made two courtesy phone calls to Respondent, which were not returned. Bar counsel tried several times to contact Respondent regarding the Order of Diversion and file no. 04-0158, but Respondent did not return bar counsel's calls. On April 14, 2004, bar counsel directed the State Bar's staff investigator to locate Respondent. On April 16, 2004, the staff investigator provided a home address, telephone number, and e-mail address for Respondent. Thereafter, bar counsel left a voice-mail message, and an e-mail message directing Respondent to contact bar counsel regarding the Order of Diversion for file no. 03-0263, and the complaint filed against him in file no. 04-0 158.

On April 19, 2004, bar counsel sent Respondent (by e-mail) a notice of non-compliance with the Order of Diversion for file no. 03-0263, and notice of failure to respond to charges filed against him in file no. 04-0158. On May 5, 2004, bar counsel again sent Respondent (by e-mail and first-class mail) a notice of non-compliance with the Order of Diversion for file no. 03-0263, and notice of failure to respond to charges filed against him in file no. 04-0 158. The May 5, 2004 mailings were not returned to the State Bar.

On June 28, 2004, upon recommendation of bar counsel, the Probable Cause Panelist issued an Order Vacating the December 8, 2003 Order of Diversion and entering an Order of Probable Cause against Respondent. Respondent's conduct as described in Count One violates Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ER 1.2 (failure to abide by client's decisions), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (failure to keep client informed), 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), ER 3.4(c) (failure to obey an order of a tribunal), 8.4(d) (prejudice the administration of justice) (effective through Nov 30, 2003); and, Rules 53(d) and (f) (failure to cooperate with or furnish information to the State Bar).

COUNT TWO (FILE NO. 04-0158)

CaMargo Damrow retained Respondent in 200 1 for her bankruptcy matter.

Ms. Damrow claims that she paid Respondent \$675.00. At the time Ms. Damrow retained Respondent, she had a pending disability claim. Ms. Damrow claims, but Respondent denies, that Respondent counseled Ms. Damrow to delay filing for bankruptcy until her disability claim was finalized.

In 2001, after Ms. Damrow's disability proceeding concluded, she contacted Respondent regarding her bankruptcy. Respondent instructed Ms. Damrow that he would secure a hearing date for her in Casa Grande. Ms. Damrow has heard nothing further from Respondent. Respondent has not returned Ms. Damrow's fees.

Ms. Damrow submitted her Bar Complaint on January 26, 2004. On March 19, 2004, bar counsel sent a charging letter directing Respondent to respond to Ms. Damrow's charges within 20 days. Respondent did not respond to bar counsel's March 19, 2004 charging letter.

The State Bar attempted to contact Respondent with regard to file no. 04-0158. On May 13, 2004, bar counsel sent a letter to Respondent directing him to respond to Ms. Damrow's charges within 20 days or bar counsel would submit the matter to formal proceedings. Respondent did not respond to that letter. Bar counsel attempted to contact Respondent regarding the Damrow matter contemporaneously and in conjunction with attempts to contact Respondent about his failure to abide by the terms of the order of diversion described in Count One, of this Tender. The State Bar has no record of Respondent responding to the State Bar's efforts to contact him about file no. 04-01 58. Respondent's conduct as described in Count One violates Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ER 1.2 (failure to abide by client's decisions), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (failure to keep client informed), 1.16 (improper withdrawal), and 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation) (effective through Nov 30, 2003); and Rules 53(d) and (f) (failure to cooperate with or furnish information to the State Bar).

MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN THE FORMAL COMPLAINT (FILE NO. 04-1495)

On August 9, 2004, the Hon. Peter C. Reinstein, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge, presided over a hearing on an order to show cause initiated by Jack H. Hirsch, counsel for Plaintiff in *Martha Carrillo vs. David Alan Reifman*, Maricopa County Sup. Ct. case no. CV 2003-000749. According to the record transcript of the hearing, the court ordered Respondent to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to complete his duties as a court-appointed arbitrator.

Mr. Hirsch testified that the arbitration had been held five months before the August 9, 2004 hearing date. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had not issued a decision and failed to respond to attempts by Mr. Hirsch to communicate with Respondent about the status of the case on April 28, 2004. Respondent failed to appear for the show cause hearing. The court appointed a new arbitrator. Mr. Hirsh testified that he did not oppose appointment of a new arbitrator, but that the delay caused by appointing a new arbitrator would prejudice his client. The court found Respondent in contempt for failure to appear and failure to file an arbitration decision and fined him \$500.00. Respondent violated Rule 42, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(d), and Rule 5 3(c).

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent, in exchange for the stated form of discipline, conditionally admits that the conduct as described in Count One violates Rule 42, specifically, ER 1.2 (failure to abide by client directions), ER 1.3 (lack of diligence), ER 1.4 (failure to keep client reasonably informed about the status of the representation), ER 1.16 (improper withdrawal and failure to return unearned fees), ER 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), ER 3.4 (failure to abide by the terms of an order of diversion), and ER 8.4(d)(prejudice to the administration of justice), Rule 53 (c) (failure to abide by an order of a tribunal), 53(d) and (f) (failure to cooperate with the State Bar's investigation).

RESTITUTION

Respondent has paid restitution to Ms. Heard in the amount of \$353.00 (See Exhibit B to Tender); and, has written to Ms. Damrow asking for verification of her address so he can pay her restitution in the amount of \$675.00 (See Exhibit C to Tender); and, Respondent has paid the \$500.00 fine imposed by the court in the August 4, 2004 show cause hearing (See Exhibit D to Tender).

DISMISSED ALLEGATIONS

In consideration of Respondent's agreement to pay restitution of the amounts claimed by the complainants Heard and Damrow in this case, the State

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Bar agrees to dismiss the allegation that Respondent violated ER 1.5 (excessive fees).

ABA STANDARDS

The ABA Standards list the following factors to consider in imposing the appropriate sanction: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer's mental state, (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. ABA Standard 3.0.

The parties indicated that Standards 4.4, 7.0 and 8.0 are the most applicable in this matter. A review of ABA Standard 4.0 (Violations of Duties Owed to Clients) indicates that suspension is the presumptive sanction for Respondent's misconduct. Standard 4.42 (Lack of Diligence) specifically provides:

Suspension is generally appropriate when:

- (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
- (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

In this matter, Respondent failed to follow up on promises that he made to Ms. Heard (Count One) about her bankruptcy matter, for which Respondent received a diversion requiring him to participate in the State Bar's LOMAP program. Since entry of the Order of Diversion, two additional matters were reported to the State Bar, Respondent's neglect of Ms. Damrow's (Count Two)

bankruptcy matter, and Respondent's failure to complete his duties as a courtappointed arbitrator. Respondent also failed to comply with the terms of the
Order of Diversion by failing to contact the Director of LOMAP as prescribed in
the order. Respondent has neglected three matters for which he accepted legal
responsibility which arguably constitutes a pattern of neglect meriting suspension.

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

This Hearing Officer then considered aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, pursuant to *Standards* 9.22 and 9.32, respectively. This Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that there are four factors present in aggravation in this matter.

- (a) prior disciplinary offenses;
- (d) multiple offenses;
- (h) vulnerability of victim; and,
- (i) substantial experience in the practice of law.

This Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that four factors are present in mitigation.

- (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
- (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;

(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; and

(l) remorse.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases that are factually similar. *In re Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 71, 876 P.2d 548, 567 (1994) (quoting *In re Wines*, 135, Ariz. 203, 207 (1983)). However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Matter of Riley*, 142 Ariz. 604, 615 (1984).

In *In re McCarthy*, SB-01-0121-D (2001), the lawyer was the subject of a three-count complaint alleging his failure to communicate with his clients, a failure to act with reasonable diligence and the failure to respond to the State Bar in its investigation of the matter. McCarthy was suspended for two years for his misconduct. Three factors were considered in aggravation: a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process. McCarthy's lack of a disciplinary history was a mitigating factor.

In *In re Sammons*, SB-03-0150-D (2003), the lawyer agreed to a censure and a one-year term of probation including LOMAP and MAP for failure to carry out his duties as a conservator, and failure to diligently represent clients in other

matters in violation of ERs 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 and 8.4(d) and Rule 51(k). Aggravating factors included pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law, while mitigating factors included absence of disciplinary history, absence of selfish or dishonest motive, full and free disclosure, and remorse.

In *In re Stevens*, SB-03-0148-D (2003), the lawyer agreed to a censure and probation including LOMAP for failure to diligently represent a client and failure to cooperate with the State Bar investigation in violation of ERs 1.3, 1.4 and 8.4(d) and Rule 51(h). Aggravating factors included prior disciplinary history, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law, while mitigating factors included absence of selfish or dishonest motive and personal and emotional problems.

In *In re Estrada*, SB-02-0044-D (2002), the lawyer agreed to a censure for failure to diligently represent and communicate with one client, failure to respond to status inquiries of medical service providers, failure to advise medical providers that their cases had settled, failure to timely pay medical providers, and failure to respond to the State Bar's investigation of three matters, violations of ERs 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, 5.1 and 8.1. Aggravating factors included multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction, and substantial experience in the practice of law,

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while mitigating factors included, no prior disciplinary history, lack of selfish or dishonest motive, and physical or mental disability, and remorse.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the degree of harm wrought by a lawyer's conduct is a factor to consider in determining the appropriate The consequence of Respondent's neglect of both the Heard and Damrow matters is rather limited. Neither Ms. Heard nor Ms. Damrow lost a legal right as the result of Respondent's failure to follow through with their representation. With regard to Ms. Heard, Respondent failed to follow through with promises made regarding some housekeeping matters after the underlying matter had concluded. With regard to Ms. Damrow, Respondent neglected to follow up with Respondent about the appropriate timing for the filing of her bankruptcy matter. Ms. Damrow obtained follow-on counsel and proceeded with the bankruptcy. Although Respondent's neglect of his duties as a court-appointed arbitrator caused substantial harm by forcing the parties to the arbitration to try the matter a second time, Respondent has already been cited for contempt and fined by the court.

Respondent has voluntarily closed his law practice and transferred to inactive status. The State Bar has no reason to believe that Respondent continues to be a threat to the public.

Respondent has also paid restitution of all monies claimed by Complainants Ms. Heard and is attempting to pay restitution to Ms. Damrow even though he believes that the amount claimed by Ms. Damrow is not accurate. Respondent has also paid his court fine. The agreed upon term of probation is calculated to provide for protection of the public in the event that Respondent returns to active status and resumes the practice of law.

RECOMMENDATION

The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter future misconduct. *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity. *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361 (1994).

In imposing discipline, it is appropriate to consider the facts of the case, the American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* ("Standards") and the proportionality of discipline imposed in analogous cases.

Matter of Bowen, 178 Ariz. 283, 286, 872 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1994).

Upon consideration of the facts, application of the Standards, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and a proportionality analysis, this Hearing

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Officer recommends acceptance of the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent and the Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent providing for the following:

- 1. Respondent shall be suspended for a period of 90 days.
- 2. As a condition precedent to Respondent's return to active status and the practice of law, Respondent shall contact the State Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP) Director and schedule a LOMAP and a MAP assessment.
- 3. Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of two years effective upon the signing of the probation contract. Bar Counsel will notify the Disciplinary Clerk of the date on which the probation begins. The terms of probation are as follows:
- Respondent shall participate in MAP and LOMAP and comply with all recommendations of the LOMAP and MAP director or her designee.
- b. In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing conditions, and the State Bar receives information, bar counsel shall file with the Hearing Officer a Notice of Non-Compliance, pursuant to Rule 60(a)5, Ariz. R. S. Ct. The Hearing Officer shall conduct a hearing within thirty days after receipt of said notice, to determine whether the terms of probation have been violated and if an additional sanction should be imposed. In the event

proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove non-compliance by clear and convincing evidence.

- 4. Respondent shall pay restitution in the amount of \$675.00 to Ms. Damrow (Count Two). Respondent shall furnish Bar Counsel with proof of payment within sixty (60) days of the Supreme Court's final order and judgment. If Respondent is unable to locate Ms. Damrow, then Respondent shall provide Bar Counsel with a sworn statement detailing Respondent's efforts to locate Ms. Damrow, in which event the State Bar reserves the right to conduct further research and instruct Respondent on how to pay the restitution.
- 5. Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses incurred in this disciplinary proceeding.

DATED this $3\frac{RD}{2}$ day of 2uu, 2005.

Stanley R. Lerner

L Hearing Officer 7V

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk this $3^{\mu\nu}$ day of 2005.

Copy of the foregoing was mailed

this 3^{20} day of $\sqrt{\text{pure}}$, 2005, to:

1	J. Scott Rhodes Respondent's Counsel
2	Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C.
3	The Collier Center, 11 th Floor
4	201 East Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85004-2385
5	Michael N. Harrison
6	Bar Counsel
7	State Bar of Arizona 4201 North 24 th Street, Suite 200
8	Phoenix, AZ 85016-6288
9	by: PWilliams
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